What the Act says
This right is based on Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Australia ratified in 1980.
It is central to fulfilling other rights such as cultural rights (sections 27 and 28) and freedom of thought, conscience and religion (section 20).
Scope of the right
The right to freedom of expression protects the ability to hold and express opinions, even if those opinions are unpopular, or disturbing. It applies to speech, art, writing, broadcasting, online communication, and more. It also protects the right to seek and receive other people’s opinions, ensuring rights for both speakers and audiences.
Freedom of expression can be limited by public entities, but only where it is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. For example, hate speech, pornography or other harmful forms of expression may be lawfully restricted.
Learn more about justification and other obligations on public entities to respect human rights.
Right to hold an opinion
Every person has a right to hold an opinion without interference. This means:
- no one should face discrimination or victimisation because of their actual or perceived opinions
- no one should be coerced into holding or abandoning an opinion.
The right to hold an opinion is a fundamental component of an individual’s privacy. Under international law, the right to hold an opinion is absolute and cannot be limited under any circumstances.
Right to freedom of expression
This includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, whether within or outside Queensland. The right protects almost all types of expression, as long as it conveys or attempts to convey a meaning. However, some forms of expression are not protected, such as:
- acts of violence
- damage to property.
The right to seek and receive information
The right to freedom of expression also includes the right to access government-held information.
In Queensland, the right to access government-held information is provided by the Right to Information Act 2009.
Case examples
Refusal to release documents justified (Queensland)
The Office of the Information Commissioner refused access to some documents under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). The decision was appealed. The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Appeals Tribunal accepted that section 21(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 implies a right to obtain certain government-held documents and information, at least if the applicant has a legitimate interest. However, there was a competing right to privacy of other people named in the documents under section 25(a) of the Human Rights Act 2019 to consider.
In this case, the tribunal decided that the Office of the Information Commissioner’s decision, applying the scheme set out in the Information Privacy Act 2009, was compatible with human rights and any limitation to freedom of expression imposed by those laws was demonstrably justified and reasonable.
Deemal-Hall v Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] QCATA 131
Extension of restraining order not an unreasonable limitation of rights (Queensland)
The Magistrates Court extended a restraining order by 2 years, preventing the appellant from posting material on the internet or in a public place about the complainant. The appellant appealed the decision.
The District Court dismissed the appeal for other reasons, however, made the following comments in relation to human rights.
The appellant argued that the decision to extend the restraining order contravened his right to freedom of expression. The Court observed that the purpose of the decision was to protect the complainant’s dignity, privacy and reputation from scandalous material that might be published by the appellant about her. The appellant’s rights were only limited in a minor way – he could still publish material about any other topic subject to general law. The fact the appellant wanted to publish material about the complainant increased the impact of the limitation on the appellant’s freedom of expression, but also strengthened the justification for imposing the restraining order. The limitation imposed by the restraining order was therefore reasonable and demonstrably justified.
Hickey v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 181
Protesting in public spaces (Queensland)
A planned sit-in protest for the rights of refugees was organised to take place on the Story Bridge, a major traffic route in Brisbane, during COVID-19. The Attorney-General successfully sought a court order to prevent the protest.
In making the decision, the Court acknowledged the rights of the protestors, including the importance in a democracy of the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association, and freedom of expression. However, limitation of these rights was justified given the significant limit to the freedom of movement of the broader community. Further, there was no evidence that protest organisers were taking reasonable steps to alleviate the risk of COVID-19 transmission.
Expression that damages third party property is not protected (Victoria)
In this case, Mr Magee painted over an advertisement in a bus shelter as a protest against the global advertising industry. He was charged with property damage and argued that the criminal charges violated with his right to freedom of expression under the Victorian Human Rights Charter.
The Supreme Court found that the painting over of the advertisement was a form of expression capable of conveying meaning, however, damaging third-party property is not protected. The Court ruled that the criminal offence of intentionally causing property damage was a lawful restriction on the right to freedom of expression, as it protected the property rights of others and maintained public order.
(Magee v Delaney [2012] VSC 407)
This information is not intended to be a substitute for legal advice.